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Abstract
This paper models the distribution of pork barrel when the elec-
toral benefit of pork does not accrue to the party in power but to the
incumbent of the district where the pork was directed. The model
shows that, under certain parametres, more pork goes to core support
districts. To verify this claim empirically, I first study the distribu-
tion of projects undertaken in the scope of the 2009-2011 Canada
Economic Action Plan, and find that districts supporting the party
in power received more pork than opposition districts controlling for
socio-economic characteristics of electoral districts and those of its
representative in Parliament. Second, taking into account the miss-
ing variable bias, this paper also shows that the allocation of projects
played a positive role in the reelection of the district incumbent party
in 2011.
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1 Introduction
Models explaining pork barrel distribution all start with the premiss that the
party in power can take credit for pork spent in the constituency and con-
clude either that core groups (Cox and McCubbins, 1986) or swing groups
(Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987) are favoured. Contrary to previous literature,
the model developped in this paper explains pork barrel distribution assum-
ing that credit is given only to the incumbent of the district that received
the pork. One could argue that district representatives do actively con-
tribute to the distribution of pork, and are therefore given credit by their
constituents, but this explanation is hard to believe in a strong party system
like Canada. Another argument is that most voters do not really understand
the allocation process, and over-estimate the role played by their representa-
tive. The fact that politicians are given credit or punished for events outside
of their control has been established empirically (Shawn, Healy and Werker,
2008). Following the assumption that the incumbent is given credit, I find
parametres under which the party in power favours core districts. To test
the assumption and the prediction of this model, I use the distribution of
projects undertaken in the scope of the Canada Economic Action Plan 2009-
2011: $40 billion invested in 15 000 infrastructure projects across the country.
In the last 20 years, much empirical research has tested whether core
or swing districts benefit from the allocation of pork barrel. Levitt & Sny-
der (1995), for example, find that Democratic control of Congress led to
more integovernmental transfers to democratic districts between 1984 and
1990, and Ansolabehere & Snyder (2006) come to the same conclusion. Den-
emark (2000), however, shows that the allocation of recreational projects
in Australia was biased towards swing districts, just like Swedish ecologi-
cal projects (Dahlberg & Johansson, 2002). This paper studies pork barrel
spending where the district incumbent receives credit for the pork and finds
support for the core district hypothesis: the most money went towards dis-
tricts strongly supporting the party in power, less money was invested in
swing districts, and the least money was given to opposition districts.
In spite of the fact that the theoretical literature uses reelection as the mo-
tivation for pork barrel spending, there is surprisingly very little empirical
research connecting pork barrel spending with subsequent election results.
Both Alvarez & Saving (1997) and Samuels (2002) attempt this analysis.
However, by not taking into account a possible missing variable bias affect-
ing both spending and reelection, their results offer little guidance. Snyder
& Levitt (1997) study the impact of pork barrel on the share of votes for
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the party in power in the district using valid instruments and find a positive
correlation between previous intergovernmental transfers and the share of
votes. Instead of studying the impact of the pork barrel allocation on the
electoral outcome of the party in power, this paper analyzes the impact on
the reelection of the district incumbent. To address the issue of the missing
variable bias, I use whether the district was in the urban core of a major
city as instrument. The results of this regression indicate that district in-
cumbents receive credit for the projects undertaken in their district. This
evidence supports the key assumption of the model.
This paper is the first to build a model explaining pork barrel distribution
assuming that the district incumbent receives the credit, and it is also the
first to find empirical evidence for this phenomenon. By finding this effect on
the incumbent in combination with the general effect on the party in power,
this paper leaves the realm of perfect rationality and assumes a more realistic
environment in which politicians making their decisions taking into account
the cognitive dissonance of the voters.
The rest of the paper is divided into the following sections. First, I build
a model. I, then, describe the data and estimation strategy. Third, I present
and discuss the results of the regression analysis. Finally, I conclude and
present further research avenues.
2 Model
As in previous models of pork barrel allocation, the party in power wants to
maximize its electoral sucess. In Lindbeck & Weibull (1987), such a strategy
means investing heavily in swing districts. In this paper, however, invest-
ments in swing districts are very risky, because the incumbent receives the
credit and not the party in power, and the party in power does not know
when the project will be completed. If the project is completed before the
first election, the candidate of the swing riding held by the party in power
will benefit greatly. However, if the project is completed after the first elec-
tion, the party is not certain whether the incumbent will be from its party.
Investing in swing districts could therefore mean helping the opponent beat
the candidate from the party in power. This trade-off between risk and re-
turn is at the heart of the model.
(Figure 1)
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Let’s first consider voters. They have a utility function over political plat-
form (pp) and investment in their district (Bi), and they will vote for the dis-
trict incumbent if their utility is greater than a threshold: uik(pp,Bi) > Uik.
Bi is the same for all voters of the same district.
The party in power allocates funds to the electoral districts in T0 to max-
imize the probability of its candidate to win the elections. Each district
receives one project, and it is completed at a random date. Project comple-
tion is random, because unforeseen problems may slow down it down. One
could also assume that civil servants decide in which order projects are under-
taken. Credit for the project accrues only to the present district incumbent
when the project is completed. Following the allocation decision, there are
two elections. The first one can take place before (with probability pi) or
after the completion of the project (with probability 1 − pi) in a given dis-
trict. The second one takes place after the completion of the project. Figure
1 illustrates the timeline.
The party in power maximizes the probability that the district elects its
candidate in the first (E1i ) and second elections (E
2
i ) by allocating pork Bi.
The more projects a district receives, the greater the utility of its residents,
and the greater the probability that it surpasses the threshold and that they
vote to reelect the incumbent. The total value of projects must satisfy the
exogenous budget condition (B):
maxBi E
1
i + E
2
i (1)
subject to:
i=n∑
i=1
Bi = B (2)
The marginal impact of projects on the election of the candidate from the
party in power in the first election is specific to the district ”i” and is known
by the party in power. It will be negative in opposition districts, because the
projects will contribute to the popularity of the opposition incumbent, and
positive in districts held by the party in power for the opposite reason. Fur-
thermore, the closer the race, the greater the absolute value of the marginal
impact, because a few voters will change the outcome. In districts in which
the voters have policy preferences very far away from those of the party in
power, the projects will not change much the probability of victory. The
marginal impact in the second election, however, is unknown, because the
party in power does not know the result of the first election, and therefore
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cannot evaluate the marginal impact of projects in the second election. The
transition probability from ”i” to ”j” is captured by P i→j
The marginal impact of pork in a given district is:
pi
∂E1i
∂Bi
|i + (1− pi)
(∫ 1
0
∂E2i
∂Bi
|jdP i→j
)
(3)
The first expression is the impact of the pork on the probability of win-
ning the first election if the project takes place before the first election. This
impact will depend on the status of the district. Pork barrel in a core oppo-
sition district, for example, will have a small negative impact on the election
of the candidate of the party in power, while it would have a large positive
impact on the election of the candidate of the party in power in a swing
district that is held by the party in power. The second expression represents
the impact of the pork barrel on the second election if the project is com-
pleted after the first election. Again, the impact will depend on the status
of the district, but this status is unknown at the time when the allocation
is determined. A swing district in the hands of the party in power before
the election could now be a swing district in the hands of the opposition. To
simplify the model, I abstract from the marginal impact of winning the first
election on the second election if the project was completed before the first
election.
To maximize the return of pork, the party in power will want to equalize
the marginal impact of pork across districts assuming that
∂2E1i
∂B2i
|i < 0. If pork
has a greater impact in a district, it will receive more pork until the decreasing
marginal contribution of pork equates the marginal benefit in other districts.
The literature distinguishes between core and swing districts, I will therefore
create four categories of districts: core opposition (co), swing opposition (so),
swing party in power (spp) and core party in power (cpp). Equation (3) can
therefore be rewritten as:
pi
∂E1i
∂Bi
|i + (1− pi)
(
P i→coi ·
∂E2i
∂Bi
|co + P i→so∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|so + P i→spp∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|spp + P i→cpp∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|cpp
)
(4)
To be able to prove some propositions comparing the amount of pork
received by each type of district, more structure is needed. Let’s make the
following assumptions.
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Assumption 1(symmetry): The probabilities are symmetric: P l→k =
P k→l where ”l” and ”k” are types of districts. This assumption means that
a district has the same probability to go, for example, from an opposition
swing district to a party in power swing district as the one to go from a party
in power swing district to an opposition swing district. This assumption is
unrealistic if a party is gaining in popularity.
Assumption 2: The absolute value of the marginal impact of both
core districts and both swing districts are equal: ∂Ei
∂Bi
|co = −∂Ei∂Bi |cpp and
∂Ei
∂Bi
|so = −∂Ei∂Bi |spp.
Assumption 3: For a given type of district, the impact of pork is the
same in the first and second elections:
∂E1i
∂Bi
|k = ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|k
Assumption 4 (proximity): It is more probable for a swing opposition
district to become a core opposition district for the second election than to
become a core party in power district. Similarly, it is more probable for a
swing party in power district to become a core party in power district than
to become an core opposition district.
Assumption 5: The probability that a core district keeps the same type
is greater than the probability that a swing district keeps the same type:
P cpp→cpp > P spp→spp and P co→co > P so→so
Assumption 2 allows a simplification comparison of the marginal impact
of pork in different types of districts. Pork has a greater marginal impact in
district of type ”k” than district of type ”l” and will therefore receive more
pork if:
pi
(
∂E1i
∂Bi
|k − ∂E
1
i
∂Bi
|l
)
+ (1− pi) (P l→co + P k→cpp − (P k→co + P l→cpp)) ∂E2i
∂Bi
|cpp
+(1− pi) (P l→so + P k→spp − (P k→so + P l→spp)) ∂E2i
∂Bi
|spp > 0 (5)
Using the previous assumptions, it is now possible to prove the following
propositions that establish the relative amount of pork received by each type
of district:
Proposition 1: If pi is small enough, pork in core party in power dis-
tricts (k=cpp) have a greater marginal impact than in swing party in power
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districts (l=spp).
Proof: Using the fact that
∂E1i
∂Bi
|k is now ∂E
1
i
∂Bi
|cpp and assumption 3, I can
distribute the first term in the second and third terms:
((1− pi) (P spp→co + P cpp→cpp − (P cpp→co + P spp→cpp)) + pi) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|cpp
+ ((1− pi) (P spp→so + P cpp→spp − (P cpp→so + P spp→spp))− pi) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|spp > 0 (6)
((1− pi) (P spp→co + P cpp→cpp − (P cpp→co + P spp→cpp)) + pi) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|cpp >
(pi − (1− pi) (P spp→so + P cpp→spp − (P cpp→so + P spp→spp))) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|spp (7)
Without loss of generality (if the term is negative, the ratio of the two
partial derivatives is no longer bounded), let’s assume that:
(pi − (1− pi) (P spp→so + P cpp→spp − (P cpp→so + P spp→spp))) > 0. (8)
It is therefore possible to express the ratio of the probabilities as an upper
bound for the ratio of the actual marginal impacts:
(1− pi) (P spp→co + P cpp→cpp − (P cpp→co + P spp→cpp)) + pi
pi − (1− pi) (P spp→so + P cpp→spp − (P cpp→so + P spp→spp)) >
∂E2i
∂Bi
|spp
∂E2i
∂Bi
|cpp
(9)
Pork barrel has a greater impact on reelection in swing party in power
districts than in core party in power districts, because voters in core party in
power districts are already convinced to vote for the party in power,
∂E2i
∂Bi
|spp
∂E2
i
∂Bi
|cpp
>
1, which means that at least:
(1− pi) (P spp→co + P cpp→cpp − (P cpp→co + P spp→cpp)) + pi
pi − (1− pi) (P spp→so + P cpp→spp − (P cpp→so + P spp→spp)) > 1 (10)
P spp→co + P cpp→cpp − (P cpp→co + P spp→cpp)
+P spp→so + P cpp→spp − (P cpp→so + P spp→spp) > 1
1− pi (11)
The left hand side can be regrouped as a sum of four terms:
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(P spp→co − P cpp→co) + (P spp→so − P cpp→so)
+(P cpp→cpp − P spp→spp) + (P cpp→spp − P spp→cpp) > 0 (12)
Due to assumption 4 (proximity), the first and second assumptions are
positive. Assumption 6 makes the third term positive, and assumption 1
makes the last term equal 0. In that sense, the expression is positive, and
could therefore be greater than 1
1−pi if pi is small enough. QED
The intuition for this result is that the risk that a party inadvertently
helps the incumbent in a swing opposition district is greater in swing party
in power districts, and this risk increases when pi is small.
Proposition 2: If pi is small enough, the marginal benefit of pork in
swing opposition district is greater than it is in core opposition district.
Proof:
pi
(
∂E1i
∂Bi
|so − ∂E
1
i
∂Bi
|co
)
+ (1− pi) (P co→co + P so→cpp − (P so→co + P co→cpp)) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|cpp
+(1− pi) (P co→so + P so→spp − (P so→so + P co→spp)) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|spp > 0(13)
Using assumptions 2 and 3, we can substitute
∂E1i
∂Bi
|so− ∂E
1
i
∂Bi
|co by ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|cpp−
∂E2i
∂Bi
|spp and rearrange to get:
((1− pi)(P co→co + P so→cpp − (P so→co + P co→cpp)) + pi) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|cpp > (−(1− pi)(P co→so + P so→spp − (P so→so + P co→spp)) + pi) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|spp
(14)
which can be rewritten as:
((1− pi)(P co→co + P so→cpp − (P so→co + P co→cpp)) + pi)
(−(1− pi)(P co→so + P so→spp − (P so→so + P co→spp)) + pi) >
∂E2i
∂Bi
|spp
∂E2i
∂Bi
|cpp
(15)
Since
∂E2i
∂Bi
|spp
∂E2
i
∂Bi
|cpp
> 1,
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((1− pi)(P co→co + P so→cpp − (P so→co + P co→cpp)) + pi)
(−(1− pi)(P co→so + P so→spp − (P so→so + P co→spp)) + pi) > 1(16)
P co→co + P so→cpp − P so→co − P co→cpp + P co→so + P so→spp − P so→so − P co→spp > 1
1− pi(17)
P co→co + P so→cpp − P so→co − P co→cpp + P co→so + P so→spp − P so→so − P co→spp)) > 1(18)
(P co→co − P so→so) + (P so→cpp − P co→cpp) + (P co→so − P so→co) + (P so→cpp − P co→cpp) > 1(19)
From assumption 6, the first term is positive. From assumption 4, the
second and fourth term are positive. From assumption 1, the third term is
zero. QED
If pi is small enough, then the distribution of pork barrel corresponds to
the predictions of the core district hypothesis: Bco ≤ Bso and Bspp ≤ Bcpp.
If pi is large, the distribution resembles the predictions of the swing dis-
trict hypothesis. One has to admit that the distribution looks a bit strange:
Bco ≥ Bso and Bspp ≥ Bcpp, but one has to know that when pi is is large,
the marginal contribution of pork to core opposition and swing opposition
districts is actually negative, so Bco = Bso = 0. The difference between Bso
and Bspp depends on (P
so→so + P spp→spp − (P spp→so + P so→spp)). If swing
opposition districts have a high probability to become swing party in power
districts and vice-versa, then more money could go to swing opposition dis-
tricts.
2.1 Numerical Example
The last two propositions establish that it is possible that core party in
power districts are favoured when pork is distributed. I now consider a
certain transition matrix (table 1) to see how small pi has to be for plausible
parametres to lead to this conclusion.Taking those transition probabilities
and using equation (9), I can build table 2 which shows the upper bound for
∂E
∂B
|spp
∂E
∂B
|cpp which supports an allocation to core districts. It would be plausible
for
∂E
∂B
|spp
∂E
∂B
|cpp to be at or above 1.5, which would mean that if pi < 0.5, one would
expect core districts to receive more projects.
(Table 2 here)
(Table 3 here)
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3 Data and Estimation Strategy
To verify this model, I study the distribution of projects undertaken within
the Economic Action Plan (EAP), and then determine whether the projects
had a positive impact on the incumbent’s reelection. It is important to keep
in mind that these projects were allocated at a time during which the Con-
servative Party of Canada (CPC) formed a minority government that could
have been defeated at any time. The parametre 1 − pi in the model could
therefore be interpreted as a probability of being defeated before the com-
pletion of projects. An optimistic government would consider that 1 − pi is
high, and would favour swing districts. Conversely, a pessimistic government
would favour core districts.
The new data set built to test this hypothesis contains the distribution
and value of projects within the EAP. I first collected data from the 15
000 projects undertaken within the EAP. Examples of projects are: road
resurfacing, sewage water plant improvements, social housing renovations,
improvements to arenas, purchase of new equipment for businesses, and ren-
ovations to federal buildings. These projects were partially funded by the
federal government and partially by provinces, municipalities and NGOs.
On average, the federal government invested 40 percent of funds. The allo-
cation procedure differed across departments or agencies responsible for the
projects. In some cases, provinces pre-selected the projects that were then
approved by the federal government, while in other cases, municipalities or
NGOs applied directly for federal funding. From the list of projects, I then
aggregated the information for the 308 Canadian electoral districts. I there-
fore have information on the number of projects, the federal amount invested
and the total value of projects for every Canadian electoral district.
In a second step, I gathered information on the October 2008 election.
Parties presented candidates in each electoral district, and the candidate who
received the most votes in the district was chosen as Member of Parliament
(MP) for that district. These elections preceded the EAP and brought the
Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) to Parliament as a minority govern-
ment with 142 MPs. For every district, I gathered information on the share
of the votes for each of the four main parties and on the party of the winning
candidate. The 2011 election followed the distribution and completion of
projects. To determine the impact of pork barrel spending on reelection, I
collected information on the reelection of incumbent parties by district. In a
third step, I found information on the MP representating the district between
2008 and 2011 (39th legislature). The experience and the previous positions
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MP could play a role in the distribution of projects, and would certainly play
a role in the reelection of the MP.
Finally, I used per district data from the 2006 census to control for socio-
economic differences between districts. This data includes the population of
the district 2, the share of the population aged 19 and below, the share of the
population aged 65 and above, the median income of a family, the share of
the immigrant population, the share of the aboriginal population, the unem-
ployment rate, whether the district was downtown, whether the district was
in the North, and whether the district was in the National Capital Region.
These explanatory variables should capture some of the needs of districts for
infrastructure.
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics for different kinds of districts.
These univariate results indicate that districts that elected CPC candidates
had significantly more projects than districts represented by other parties.
When considering the value of projects, however, there is no significant uni-
variate difference between CPC and opposition districts. Since close races
did not receive more projects, these preliminary results would speak for the
core district hypothesis. It could however be the case that certain socio-
economic groups tended to vote CPC and that these groups needed infras-
tructure investments. Table 4 explores this possibility. Not surprisingly, the
socio-economic chracteristics of a district are correlated with the party rep-
resenting it. For example, constituents of CPC districts have higher income,
a lower unemployment rate and a higher participation rate. Since CPC dis-
tricts seem to be richer on average, the positive bias towards CPC district
will probably be accentuated when I include the socio-economic variables in
the multivariate regressions.
(Table 3 here)
(Table 4 here)
3.1 Estimation of the Distribution of Projects
The first regression models the amount of money spent by the federal gov-
ernment. I use this amount and not the total amount, because the federal
2All districts have a population of approximately 100 000, except districts in Prince-
Edward-Island and in the three territories: Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut
that have a population of 30 000 each
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government did not control the total value of the project, but only the amount
it invested. One problem with the value of projects is its lack of robustness.
Every project is indicated at a single location, but certain large projects
(highways, for example) could be taking place across many districts. Fur-
thermore, there could be a mistake in the location of projects on the map
used to create the dataset. If all projects were of the same magnitude, these
two problems would probably even themselves out. The EAP, however, con-
tains a large spectrum of projects of different sizes. It is therefore also useful
to model the number of projects in a district as well, because the number
of projects is not affected by the size of projects, and can therefore serve
as a robustness check. I explain these two dependent variables with the
socio-economic characteristics of the district, the characteristics of the MP
representing the district, and the results of the 2008 election:
federal amount = β1 socioeconomic + β2 MP + β32008 Election +  (20)
The coefficients of interest are those related to 2008 elections. If the core
district hypothesis is true, one would expect a positive coefficient for districts
that elected a CPC candidate in 2008. Furthermore, if the model elaborated
previously and the one from Cox & McCubbins (1986) are correct, one would
predict a positive coefficient for the difference between the CPC candidate
and the best opposition candidate as illustrated by figure 2. This difference
is small and postive when a CPC candidate is elected by a small margin and
is large and negative when an opposition candidate is elected with a large
margin. Conversely, if the swing district hypothesis is correct, I expect 1)
a negative coefficient for the difference between a winning opposition candi-
date and the CPC candidate and 2) a negative coefficient for the difference
between a winning CPC candidate and the best opposition candidate. When
these differences are small, the district is considered a swing district (see fig-
ure 2). Since Canada operates according to the Westminster system and has
strong parties, I follow Snyder & Primo (2010) and predict that funds will be
directed towards swing districts to help the CPC gain a majority government.
(Figure 2)
Alvarez & Saving (1987b) and Smart & Milligan (2005) show that MP
characteristics play a major role in the distribution of pork barrel. More ex-
perienced and better connected MPs should be able to bring more money to
their district. More specifically, members of the Privy Council and more ex-
perienced MPs should bring more money to their district. The Privy Council
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is not particularly well known among Canadians, but all its members are ac-
tual or former members of the cabinet. These politicians are or have been
important figures of government, and therefore know its inner-workings. It is
therefore realistic to assume that they have an advantage when seeking pork
barrel for their constituents. As for experience, I include two dummies: less
than 5 years of experience as MP and more than 10 years of experience as MP.
The purpose of the EAP is to support families and communities in need.
The socio-economic characteristics of districts should remove this effect and
show to which extent spending was directed towards these communities. The
unemployment rate should, for example, be positively correlated with the
value of projects, while the median income of the district should negatively
impact the resources going towards that district. Independently of these char-
acteristics, some districts simply require more money. For example, districts
comprising the downtown area of a city have more and older infrastructure,
and districts located in the North are in dire need for infrastructure.
3.2 Estimation of the Impact of Projects
While the first model explains the distribution of funding, the second model
analyses the impact of these projects on the reelection of the district incum-
bent party using the total amount spent in the district, the 2008 election
results, and MP characteristics. The variable of interest is the total amount
of spending in a district. This variable is used instead of the amount spent
by the federal government, because it is easier for voters to assess the total
value of a project than to determine how much the federal government in-
vested. Actually, in light of the publicity done by the federal government,
it would not be surprising that voters give full credit to the federal govern-
ment for projects only partially funded by it. As in the previous model, I
also use the number of projects in a district, but the motivation is slightly
different. When voters travel through the district, the probability of them
seeing the poster of a project and being reminded of the EAP would depend
on the number of projects, not on the value of projects. By using both the
total value and the number of projects, I can compare the two coefficients.
A significant difference would indicate whether there is an electoral benefit
to undertake many low-scale projects or a few expensive projects.
As noted by Snyder & Levitt (1997), it would be inappropriate to simply
use the total amount (or the number of projects) in the regression, because of
a missing variable bias. Just like the total value of projects in a district, the
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probability of reelection is correlated with the perceived tightness of the race
and with the political skills of the MP. In the latter case, MPs with superior
political skills will have the connections to direct money towards their dis-
tricts, and these skills will also serve them to secure reelection. Since neither
the perceived tightness of the race nor the political skills can be observed
and included in a regression, I need instrumental variables to remove the
correlation between explanatory variables and the error term. Such variables
should be correlated with the total value of projects, but uncorrelated with
the probability of reelection. The instrument chosen is whether the district
is in the urban core of a major city. Downtown districts have more and older
infrastructure. They therefore need more money. However, there is no rea-
son to believe that constituents in downtown districts have a greater or lower
tendency to reelect the incumbent party.
To verify this claim, I compare downtown districts with non-downtown
districts in table 5. Two differences stand out: there are fewer children and
more immigrants in downtown districts. Since immigrants probably have not
had time to choose a favourite party, their vote could be more volatile. Sim-
ilarly, downtowns probably have a greater fluctuation of people thus leading
to a greater fluctuation in party allegiance. Both factors would speak for a
negative relationship between the reelection of the district incumbent party
and downtown districts. If this were the case, it would mean that the num-
ber of projects in a district would have a negative impact on incumbency
since there were more projects in downtown districts. Since the opposite is
found (see table 8), the number of immigrants and the transient nature of
downtowns do not jeopardize the validity of the instruments. Furthermore,
to specifically see if downtown incumbents have a higher likelihood of reelec-
tion, I analyze the probability of reelection of district incumbent parties in
the 2004, 2006 and 2008 elections. The probability of an incumbent party
to be reelected across these three elections was 86.7 percent in downtown
districts and was 83.6 percent in non-downtown districts. This difference is
not significant. If I include regional dummies (East, Quebec, Ontario and
West) and time dummies in a probit regression, the variable downtown is
still not significant.
(Table 5 here)
The 2004 election is particularly interesting, because it followed a reces-
sion (2001-2002) as did the 2011 election. During the 2004 election, 80 per-
cent of downtown incumbents were reelected and 83 percent of non-downtown
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incumbents were reelected. It would be a problem if downtown districts had
not been more prone to reelect the incumbent in spite of an increase in gov-
ernment spending preceding the election as in 2011. There was however no
large increase of spending in the 2003 or 2004 budgets 3 which could have
favoured downtown locations. Budget 2003 increased spending for munic-
ipal infrastructure by $ 3 billion over ten years, and budget 2004 alloted
$1 billion for the municipal rural infrastructure fund (Canadian Department
of Finance, 2011). In comparison to the $ 42 billion plan over two years,
these two initiatives are very small, and the biggest from the two, the mu-
nicipal rural infrastructure clearly fund went to rural districts. There was
therefore no increase in spending in downtown districts preceding the 2004
election. All in all, downtown districts have not been more prone to reelect
incumbents, especially not in elections following economic downturns. Since
the downtown variable is able to withhold these tests, it is a valid instrument.
Since a CPC government allocated the resources, theory would suggest
that I also test whether spending had an impact on the election of CPC candi-
dates instead of testing whether it had an impact on the reelection of district
incumbent. Unfortunately, the missing variable bias makes it difficult to test
the former model. It would be indeed very difficult to find valid instruments
for a regression with the election of the CPC as dependent variable. Indeed,
any district characteristic related with the spending pattern would be corre-
lated with the party elected. Districts in the north, for example, could have
been brought towards the CPC in the 2011 elections due to their opposition
to the long gun registry. District characteristics not related with the election
of a CPC candidate would probably be only remotely related to the spending.
This situation would therefore lead to a weak instrument problem, and the
relatively small sample of 308 observations would make identification nearly
impossible.
The second block of explanatory variables stems from the 2006 and 2008
elections. The first variable is the difference between the winning and runner-
up candidate independently of parties in the 2008 elections. When this dif-
ference is small, I expect the probability of defeat of the incumbent to be
high. The second variable consists of a dummy whether the district reelected
the same party in 2006 and 2008. A district that changed hands between
2006 and 2008 is volatile and will probably change hands again in 2011. The
last variable is whether the district elected a candidate from the CPC in 2008
and captures the gain of popularity of the CPC from 2008 to 2011.
3There was no budget in 2002 as the 2001 budget was in December.
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The third block consists of MP characteristics. Certain MPs are better
known, which should help their reelection bid. I therefore include whether
the MP is a member of the Privy Council, and two dummies for experience.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Distribution of Projects
Table 4 presents the results of the regression explaining the federal amounts
spent by district. The first surprising result is the general lack of significance
of socio-economic variables. One of the pillars of the plan was to provide
support to communities and families, but there is no indication that money
was directed towards poorer districts in need of support. One possible expla-
nation is that census data from 2006 no longer reflected the relative poverty
of districts in 2009, possibly because the financial crisis hurt specific districts
independently of their initial situation. The plan could therefore still have
supported poorer communities and families, but our data cannot capture the
specific impact of the financial crisis.
Contrary to findings from Smart & Milligan (2005), MP characteristics
played no role in the allocation of funds. This result supports the idea
that MPs play little role in policy development, and therefore should not
be granted any credit for the distribution of projects.
The results of the political variables support the core district hypothesis,
and corroborate those of Smart & Milligan (2005). Furthermore, the results
correspond exactly to the predictions from Cox & McCubbins (1986). In
Table 6, model (1) shows the increase in the difference between a winning
CPC candidate and the runner-up has a positive impact on the amount of
money received by the district from the federal government. Furthermore,
the increase in the difference between a winning opposition candidate and
a losing CPC candidate has a negative impact. In neither of these cases is
the coefficient significant, but in model (3) the variable subtracting the share
of the vote for the CPC from the share of the vote for the best opposition
candidate1, the coefficient is positive and significant as in figure 1. In other
words, districts where the CPC won by a great margin (support group) re-
ceived a lot of money, districts where it was a close race reaped less (swing
districts), and, finally, districts where the opposition party won by a great
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margin got the least. Unsurprisingly, the CPC dummy is positive and gains
significance when going from the over-specified model (2) to the more parsi-
monious model (4) thus supporting the core district hypothesiss.
(Table 6 here)
Table 7 contains the coefficients when the number of projects per district
is the dependent variable. This robustness check confirms previous findings
concerning political variables. CPC districts did receive more projects, but
this coefficient loses its significance when I include the difference between the
CPC candidate and the best opposition candidate meaning that the latter
variable explains better the variations in the number of projects. For every
1% increase in this difference, the district received 0.3 projects more. This
number might seem small but knowing that the average project represents
almost $3 million, a small increase in the voting difference would have a sub-
stantial impact on the community.
Interestingly, when considering the number of projects, more socio-economic
variables become significant. The unemployment rate and the share of se-
nior citizens, for example, become significant and positive. One reason for
this sudden change is that poverty reduction projects were smaller in scope
but greater in number. Indeed, the average project for the renovation and
retrofit of social housing was $107 924, while the average project from the
infrastructure stimulus fund was close to one million dollars.
(Table 7 here)
4.2 Impact of Projects on Reelection
Before considering the results of the probit regression explaining the reelec-
tion of incumbent parties, it is important to consider the significance of
the variable: downtown in explaining both the value of federal funding and
the number of projects. In both cases, the variable is highly significant,
because there is a need for investment in downtown cores. Without a con-
stant, downtown explains 27 percent of the variation in federal investment
(F-value: 112.2) and 7 percent in the variation in the number of projects
(F-value: 23.3). In that sense, it captures enough of the variation to avoid
the problem of weak instruments, but it also does not capture too much of
the endogenous part of the variable.
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Table 8 presents the results of the probit regressions explaining the re-
election of the incumbent party of the district. These results must be taken
with caution, because instrumental variables are still biased in finite sample
in the presence of endogeneity, and it is dubious whether 308 observations
are sufficient to assume asymptotic properties. Even though the coefficients
of the IV regression are about double the size of the probit coefficients, the
Wald test of exogeneity fails to reject exogeneity at the 5% mark in both cases
(it rejects at the 10% mark). The endogeneity problem discussed in Levitt &
Snyder (1997) might not be as much of a problem as initially assumed, be-
cause the federal government does not fully control the total amount of pork
barrel going to a given district. The fact that other organisations contribute
to the projects could reduce the missing variable bias, because the decisions
of these organisations do not depend on the missing variable.
The most important result of table 8 is the significant and positive co-
efficient for both the number of projects and the total amount spent in a
district. This finding contradicts the ones from Samuels (2002), and clearly
shows that the incumbent party received credit for the value and the num-
ber of projects undertaken in the district as assumed in the model. Since it
would be interesting to see whether CPC MPs get more credit, I also ran the
regression explaining the number of projects with the interaction between
CPC and the number of projects. Since OLS estimates seem unbiased, this
regression was done with the setting of model 1. The coefficient of the inter-
action term was positive but not significant (result not reported), meaning
that CPC MPs did not benefit more than opposition MPs from the number
of projects spent in their district.
At first glance, it seems surprising that the incumbent party of a district
would get any credit for decisions taken by the party in power. However,
since voters are generally known to be poorly informed about policies and
politicians (Bartels, 1996), it is realistic to think that voters probably know
very little about the process leading to the allocation of projects. Voters
could therefore give credit to their MP for projects in their district. If voters
punish the incumbent for natural disasters (Cole, Healy and Werker, 2008),
they could equally well give credit to the incumbents for positive outcomes
outside of his control. If this idea is known by the CPC and the party would
fear an election due to its status as minority government, the model predicts
the CPC would want to favour core CPC districts.
The difference in magnitude between number of projects and total amount
is small. As previously mentioned, the value of the average project is about
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$3 million. It would therefore seem that adding an extra project in a dis-
trict would benefit more the incumbent than an increase of $3 million in
an already established project. Again, since the IV variables are biased in
finite sample, this difference only suggests that there could be an advantage
to spread out money in many projects instead of concentrating it in a few
expensive projects, but more research needs to be done.
As for the other variables, conservative candidates benefited from a net
advantage for reelection. This finding is not surprising considering the gain
of popularity of the party across Canada. Members of the Privy council and
MPs running again tend to be reelected with a greater probability. In both
cases, these candidates are better known and therefore have an advantage
against challengers. The margin between the runner-up and the elected can-
didate has a positive but small impact on reelection.
(Table 8 here)
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of pork barrel allocation where the incumbent
and not the party in power receives electoral credit and finds empirical sup-
port for it. First, it finds evidence for the core district hypothesis using data
from the projects of the 2009-2011 Canada Economic Action Plan. Second, it
shows that the number and value of projects undertaken within the economic
action plan had a significant impact on the reelection of the incumbent in
the 2011 election. The latter empirical finding suggests that pork barrel may
not affect only benefit the party in power, but also the district incumbent.
This new channel increases the complexity of pork barrel distribution.
Throughout this paper, I consider projects as homogeneous, but this as-
sumption is hardly realistic. Repairs to an aqueduct could be as expensive
as repairs to arenas, but the latter is much more visible. Different kinds of
projects could serve different purposes. Future research will focus on the dif-
ferences between the kinds of projects, their distribution and their differential
impact on voting. These differences in visibility could explain the variety of
empirical results found in the literature. If certain kinds of projects have a
great impact on the electorate, third parties should allocate these resources
and not politicians to reduce pork barrel spending. The approval process
also differs across kinds of project. There is no one person who approved
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all projects. Different agencies/departments were responsible for different
kinds of projects, and all their own procedures. In some cases, there was
cooperation with provincial authorities to choose projects; in other cases,
NGOs competed to receive financing. If procedures matter, the distribution
of these projects will depend on the allocation process. Future research will
investigate the numerous processes for different strands of projects and the
outcomes they produced. This future research could lead to an improvement
in the efficiency of project allocation by finding procedures that minimize the
impact of pork barrel spending.
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A Definitions
Diff MP Opp - Cons cand/ Difference between opposition MP and
conservative candidate: share of the vote for the opposition canadidate
who won the election in the district share of the vote for the conservative
candidate. Always positive. If this number is negative, the variable equals 0.
Diff MP Cons - Opp cand / Difference between conservative MP
and best opposition candidate: share of the vote for the conservative
candidate who won the election in the district share of the vote for the
opposition candidate who received the most vote. Always positive. If this
number is negative, the variable equals 0.
Difference Cons - Best Opp cand / Difference between conserva-
tive candidate and best opposition candidate: share of the vote for
the conservative candidate who won the election in the district share of the
vote for the opposition candidate who received the most vote.
Northern districts: Labrador, Manicouagan, Abitibi Baie-James Nunavik
Eeyou, Kenora, Timmins James Bay, Churchill, Desnethe Missinippi Churchill
River, Fort McMurray Athabasca, Peace River, Prince George Peace River,
Skeena Bulkley Valley, Yukon, Western Arctic, and Nunavut.
Downtown districts: Quebec, Westmount Ville-Marie, Hamilton Centre,
Ottawa Centre, Toronto Centre, Trinity Spadina, Winnipeg Centre, Calgary
Centre, Edmonton Centre, and Vancouver Centre.
Privy Council: Humber St. Barbe Baie Verte, Cardigan, Charlottetown,
Malpeque, Central Nova, Halifax West, Kings Hants, Sydney Victoria, Beause-
jour, Fredericton, New Brunswick Southwest, Beauce, Bourassa, Jonquiere
Alma, Laurier Sainte-Marie, Louis-St-Laurent, Megantic L’Erable, Mount
Royal, NDG Lachine, Pontiac, Roberval Lac-St-Jean, Saint-Laurent Cartierville,
Beaches East York, Bramalea Gore Malton, Cambridge, Carleton Missis-
sipi Mills, Durham, Eglington Lawrence, Etobicoke Lakeshore, Haldimand
Norfolk, Halton, Kingston and the Islands, Markham Unionville, Missis-
saugaBrampton South, Mississauga East Cooksville, Niagara Falls, Ottawa
Vanier, Ottawa West Nepean, Parry Sound Muskoka, Pickering Scaborough
East, Richmond Hill, St. Paul’s, Scaborough Agincourt, Scaborough Guild-
wood, Simcoe-Grey, Thornhill, Toronto Centre, Toronto Danforth, Vaughan,
Wellington Halton Hills, Whitby Oshawa, York Centre, York Simcoe, York
West, Charleswood St.James Assiniboia, Provencher, Winnipeg South Cen-
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tre, Battlefords Lloydminster, Blackstrap, Wascana, Calgary Centre-North,
Calgary Nose-Hill, Calgary Southeast, Calgary Southwest, Edmonton Spruce
Grove, Yellowhead, Chilliwack Fraser Canyon, Esquimalt Juan de Fuca,
Okanagan Coquihalla, Port Moody Westwood Port Coquitlam, Prince George
Peace River, Saanich Gulf Islands, Vancouver Centre, Vancouver South,
Yukon, and Nunavut.
Cabinet: Egmont, Central Nova, Fredericton, Fundy Royal, New Brunswick
Southwest, Jonquiere Alma, Louis-Saint-Laurent, Megantic-L’Erable, Pon-
tiac, Roberval Lac St-Jean, Cambridge, Carleton, Mississipi Mills, Durham,
Haldimand Norfolk, Halton, Niagara Falls, Ottawa West Nepean, Parry
Sound Muskoka, Simcoe Grey, Whitby Oshawa, York Simcoe, Charleswood
St. James Assiniboia, Provencher, Battlefords Lloydminster, Blackstrap,
Calgary Centre North, Calgary Nose Hill, Calgary Southeast, Calgary South-
west, Edmonton Spruce Grove, Yellowhead, Chilliwack Fraser Canyon, Okana-
gan Coquihalla, Port Moody Westwood Port Coquitlam, Prince George Peace
River, Saanich Gulf Islands, Nunavut.
Ottawa districts: Hull Aylmer, Gatineau, Ottawa Centre, Ottawa Orleans,
Ottawa South, Ottawa Vanier, and Ottawa West Nepean.
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B Figures
Figure 1: Timeline of Events
-
T0: Decision Taking T1: First Election T2: Second Election
Project Completion Window
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Difference between the share of votes to the conservative candidate
and the share of votes to the best opposition candidate
Opposition Party Victory Conservative Victory
Swing districts
Cox & McCubbins (1986)
Core District Hypothesis
Lindbeck & Weibull (1987)
Swing District Hypothesis
Pork Barrel
Figure 2:
Empirical Predictions for the Amount of Pork Barrel
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C Tables
Table 1: Transition Probability of Status
District Status (First Election)
CO SO SPP CPP
District Status (Second Election) CO 60 30 10 0
SO 20 35 35 10
SPP 10 35 35 20
CPP 0 10 30 60
Note: All numbers are probabilities.
Definitions: CO: Core Opposition, SO: Swing Opposition, SPP: Swing
Party in Power, and CPP: Core Party in Power.
Table 2: Relationship between pi and the upper bound of
∂E
∂B
|spp
∂E
∂B
|cpp
pi Upper Bound
0.1 41.5
0.2 4
0.3 2.3
0.4 1.7
0.5 1.5
0.6 1.3
0.7 1.2
0.8 1.1
0.9 1
1.0 1
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Table 3: Distribution of Projects per District according to the Results of the
2008 Elections
Average
Number of
Projects
Total Federal
Investment
(million $)
Total
Value
(million $)
Number of
Districts
Conservative districts 53.5 54.8 139 142
Non-conservative districts 44.2 55.2 135 166
Significant Difference at 5% Yes No No
Close Races 39.9 53 134 61
Landslide 50.6 55.5 138 246
Significant Difference at 5% Yes No No
Note: Close races are districts where CPC won or lost by less than 10% of
votes. Landslide are districts where the CPC won or lost by more than
10%. There are 308 electoral districts in Canada, but the CPC party did
not present a candidate in the district of Port-Neuf-Jacques-Cartier in the
2008 election. For this reason, the sum of districts for close races and
landslide is 307.
Table 4: Socio-Economic Description of Districts
Conservative Opposition Significant Difference
in Means (5%)
Population 105,060 100,568 No
Share under 19 (%) 25.8 23.2 Yes
Share over 65 (%) 13.8 13.9 No
Median Income ($) 67,670 60,900 Yes
Immigrant (%) 14.0 21.2 Yes
Aboriginal (%) 5.8 3.6 Yes
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.8 8.1 Yes
Downtown (%) 1.4 4.8 No
North (%) 4.2 4.8 No
National Capital Region (%) 1.4 3 No
Number of Districts 142 166
Note: The variables are described in more details in the appendix.
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Table 5: Socio-Economic Description of Downtown Districts
Non-Downtown Downtown Significant Difference
in Means (5%)
Population 102,363 110,869 No
Share under 19 (%) 24.7 16.0 Yes
Share over 65 (%) 13.8 13.6 No
Median Income ($) 64,070 62,565 No
Immigrant (%) 17.6 28.0 Yes
Aboriginal (%) 4.7 3.6 No
Unemployment Rate (%) 7.0 6.7 No
Number of Districts 298 10
Note: The variables are described in more details in the appendix.
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Table 6: Allocation of Federal Money to Canadian Electoral Districts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total population 270.4 267.0 263.8
(1.90) (1.86) (1.85)
Share below 19 -422086089.0∗ -393948528.8∗ -420169438.9∗ -311250665.7∗∗ -333904765.5∗∗
(-2.30) (-2.20) (-2.30) (-3.15) (-3.17)
Share above 65 -104346933.2 -76191796.8 -89784836.2
(-0.75) (-0.55) (-0.66)
Median income -51.28 26.71 -11.91
(-0.17) (0.09) (-0.04)
Share immigrant -12732885.2 -12913268.1 -10080145.4
(-0.44) (-0.44) (-0.34)
Share aboriginal 29976526.6 37365345.3 33788890.7
(0.69) (0.81) (0.76)
Unemployment rate 136446715.8 76287842.2 132435259.7
(1.76) (1.05) (1.74)
Downtown 167353242.9∗∗∗ 168399545.6∗∗∗ 167068846.8∗∗∗ 178592420.0∗∗∗ 177367505.2∗∗∗
(3.49) (3.47) (3.48) (3.54) (3.56)
North 98879857.9∗∗∗ 97395377.1∗∗∗ 98133575.9∗∗∗ 104444834.2∗∗∗ 106373469.6∗∗∗
(5.78) (5.43) (5.71) (6.92) (7.08)
Ottawa 14503623.9 13066180.8 15166095.3
(0.92) (0.81) (0.97)
Privy Council -13993642.3 -12665829.7 -13533706.8
(-1.85) (-1.72) (-1.84)
MP less than 5 years 1552446.8 2261979.2 2775101.1
(0.19) (0.33) (0.40)
MP more than 10 years 4527982.6 3344735.8 3820685.1
(0.51) (0.37) (0.42)
Diff MP Opp - Cons cand -530786.0
(-1.46)
Diff MP Cons - Opp cand 260696.8
(1.40)
Conservative 2008 15379764.9 14311302.5∗
(1.95) (2.05)
Diff Cons - Best Opp cand 364120.6∗ 298561.6∗
(2.42) (2.25)
Constant 133599904.8 112116957.6 125179029.7 113935317.6∗∗∗ 125487882.4∗∗∗
(1.87) (1.73) (1.89) (4.85) (4.84)
R2 0.395 0.388 0.395 0.373 0.378
N 307 308 307 308 307
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: all standard errors are robust. The variables are defined in the appendix.
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Table 7: Allocation of Projects to Canadian Electoral Districts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total population 0.00000970 -0.0000142 -0.0000124 -0.0000156
(0.09) (-0.13) (-0.11) (-0.14)
Share below 19 12.22 14.62 16.47 -7.195
(0.21) (0.25) (0.27) (-0.12)
Share above 65 189.9∗∗ 232.0∗∗∗ 211.2∗∗∗ 198.8∗∗∗ 176.0∗∗∗
(3.20) (4.17) (3.48) (3.42) (4.30)
Median income 0.000107 0.000226 0.000183 0.000149
(0.63) (1.35) (1.04) (0.88)
Share immigrant -58.12∗∗∗ -49.43∗∗∗ -52.85∗∗∗ -49.99∗∗∗ -50.87∗∗∗
(-6.89) (-5.60) (-5.98) (-5.84) (-7.49)
Share aboriginal 49.09 60.08 55.06 52.06
(1.24) (1.60) (1.38) (1.39)
Unemployment rate 259.4∗∗∗ 249.1∗∗∗ 228.5∗∗∗ 276.8∗∗∗ 280.5∗∗∗
(4.77) (4.64) (4.12) (5.24) (5.51)
Downtown 48.91∗∗∗ 47.81∗∗∗ 48.38∗∗∗ 47.20∗∗∗ 50.82∗∗∗
(4.47) (4.62) (4.47) (4.45) (4.92)
North 27.59∗ 25.48∗ 26.74∗ 27.48∗ 42.16∗∗∗
(2.32) (2.17) (2.18) (2.41) (4.22)
Ottawa 14.16 16.38 14.79 16.66
(1.30) (1.55) (1.30) (1.55)
Privy Council 1.805 3.138 2.701 1.920
(0.47) (0.83) (0.68) (0.50)
MP less than 5 years -4.884 -0.995 -3.110 -2.839
(-1.61) (-0.35) (-1.02) (-0.95)
MP more than 10 years 6.875 4.656 5.243 5.610
(1.74) (1.14) (1.30) (1.40)
Diff MP Opp - Cons cand -0.516∗∗∗
(-3.86)
Diff MP Cons - Opp cand 0.339∗∗∗
(3.70)
Conservative 2008 10.89∗∗ -1.124 -0.747
(2.88) (-0.23) (-0.16)
Diff Cons - Best Opp cand 0.297∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗
(3.59) (3.84)
Constant 3.819 -20.82 -13.22 -2.076 9.532
(0.13) (-0.78) (-0.45) (-0.07) (1.40)
R2 0.459 0.453 0.444 0.467 0.439
N 308 307 308 307 307
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note:All standard errors are robust. The variables are defined in the appendix.
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Table 8: Reelection of District Incumbent Party in the 2011 Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit IV Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit IV Probit
Conservative 2008 1.746∗∗∗ 1.279∗∗ 1.310∗∗ 1.782∗∗∗ 1.620∗∗∗ 1.635∗∗∗
(7.66) (3.08) (3.12) (8.05) (6.00) (6.21)
Change Party 06-08 0.609∗ 0.304 0.303 0.768∗∗ 0.760∗∗ 0.787∗∗
(2.09) (0.93) (1.04) (2.65) (2.71) (2.94)
Victory Margin 08 0.0173∗ 0.0111 0.00791 0.0218∗∗ 0.0200∗∗ 0.0192∗∗
(2.31) (1.41) (1.07) (2.91) (2.73) (2.81)
MP Ran 0.532 0.573 0.662∗ 0.697∗ 0.704∗
(1.64) (1.96) (1.97) (2.17) (2.26)
MP less 5 years 0.138 0.195 0.102 0.0741
(0.58) (0.90) (0.43) (0.33)
MP more than 10 years 0.0744 0.0409 0.0879 0.0152
(0.29) (0.17) (0.34) (0.06)
Privy Council 0.373 0.322 0.484∗ 0.557∗ 0.542∗
(1.57) (1.46) (2.04) (2.44) (2.57)
Number Project 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0281∗∗∗ 0.0287∗∗∗
(3.86) (4.26) (4.73)
Value Projects (10mio) 0.0190∗∗ 0.0364∗∗∗ 0.0364∗∗∗
(3.10) (3.33) (3.37)
Constant -1.823∗∗∗ -2.356∗∗∗ -1.655∗∗∗ -1.783∗∗∗ -1.973∗∗∗ -1.935∗∗∗
(-4.54) (-6.40) (-8.05) (-4.23) (-4.88) (-5.14)
R2 0.38 0.37
N 308 308 308 308 308 308
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: In column 1, the number of project is used to explain the re-election of the district incumbent
party. In columns 2 and 3, whether the district was downtown or not was used as instrument for the
number of projects. Even though, the coefficient from the IV regression is twice the one from the probit
regression, the Wald test cannot reject exogeneity at the 5% level. In column 4, the value of projects (10
mio) is used in an OLS regression to explain the dependent variable. In columns 5-6, the fact that the
riding was downtown is used as instrument for the value of projects. Even though, the coefficient from
the IV regression is twice the one from the probit regression, the Wald test cannot reject exogeneity at
the 5% level.
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